公司上市動機與盈餘管理

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1、國國 成成 功功 大大 學學 會會 計計 學學 研研 究究 所所 碩碩 士士 文文 公司上市動機與盈餘管公司上市動機與盈餘管 The Motivations and Earnings Management of Initial Public Offerings. 研研 究究 生:張瓊月生:張瓊月 指導教授:芬師指導教授:芬師 中華民國九十月中華民國九十月 I摘摘 要要 新上市公司(Initial Public Offerings, IPOs)的議題一向為學術界及實務界的研究焦 點,然而,規劃上市時程通常是企業生命週期重要的階段之一,因此,上市對企業 ,必定存有相當大的誘因,以往文獻分別指出新上

2、市公司盈餘操縱的為可能在籌 資前後發生,亦可能與內部人股權結構有關;基於公司可能以籌資或是內部人自作 為上市目的,本研究探討企業管階層在面初次上市時,以實現內部人極大化 及以資需求為上市動機之公司,分析及檢測上市後盈餘管為與影響。 本研究以 1998 至 2003 於台灣證券交所新上市之公司為研究對象,經篩選 後得到 280 家樣本公司。實證結果顯示: 一、以裁決性應計項目之絕對值檢定上市前一至上市後第二之盈餘管程,發 現公司的確在上市前一至上市後二有盈餘管為。 二、企業成時間長短在上市後一、上市後二與裁決性應計項目呈正相關;而在 上市當則企業成時間長短與裁決性應計項目呈正相關。 三、以上市當

3、、上市後一、上市後二,動比變動幅與裁決性應計 項目成正相關。 四、上市當有資需求的公司,其財務預測差程與盈餘管程成正相關。 上市後一及上市後二有資需求的公司,其公司成時間長短及動比變 動幅,均與裁決性應計項目呈正相關。 五、對 2001 3 月前 IPO 的公司而言,董監事持股比變動僅在上市當及上市 後一與盈餘管程成正相關;而大股東持股比變動僅於上市後二與裁決 性應計項目呈正相關。對 2001 3 月後 IPO 的公司,董監事持股比變動 在上市後一、上市後二與盈餘管程成正相關;大股東持股比變動於上 市後一及上市後二與裁決性應計項目呈正相關。 、上市當及上市後一有資需求的公司,比沒有資需求的公司

4、存在顯著盈 餘管為;上市後二有資需求的公司,並未比上市後二沒有資需求的 公司存在顯著盈餘管為。 七、資需求額與盈餘管程在上市當至上市後二互為反向關係;資需 求規模(資需求額 / 期初總資產)則與盈餘管程呈正相關。也就是, 新上市公司資需求額愈高者大部份屬於成長型企業,其營業績效多為持續成 長,盈餘管動機較強;當公司資需求規模愈大,盈餘管程愈強。 八、資需求額隨上市時間愈久,對盈餘管程影響程愈小。 關鍵字:盈餘管,上市動機,裁決性應計項目。 IIAbstract Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) is an important topic for academic

5、and practical research. However, planning to go public is usually considered a critical phase in an enterprise life cycle. Thus, going public must be of sizable inducement for enterprise. The former studies indicated that earnings management might happen surrounding the seasoned equity offerings or

6、issuing bonds, and it might have relations to insiders stock ownership. Considered the companies might deem the opportunity of going public to mainly raise funds or maximize insider peoples profit, the main purpose of this study is to examine that the managers of the IPOs how to manage earnings whil

7、e going public, and whether IPOs with different motivations of going public, such as maximize insider peoples profit, raise funds, manipulate earnings after going public. The sample examined consists of 280 IPO firms in Taiwan Stock Exchange between 1998 and 2003. The empirical results are shown as

8、below. First, when using the absolute value of discretionary accruals to test whether the IPOs manipulate earnings surrounding going public, the results show that the managements of IPOs do manipulate earnings surrounding going public. Second, the independent variable, months, is with positive relat

9、ion to discretionary accruals in year t+1 and t+2, and it is with negative relation to discretionary accruals in year t. Third, the independent variable, the change of current ratio, is with positive relation to discretionary accruals from year t to t+2. Fourth, the independent variable, forecast er

10、ror, is with positive relation to discretionary accruals in the companies which have demand of capital in year t. Nevertheless, the independent variables, months, the change of current ratio, and the size of capital, are with positive relation to discretionary accruals in the companies which have de

11、mand of capital in year t+1 and t+2. IIIFifth, the samples are divided into two groups, the IPOs which went public before and after March, 2001. The independent variable, the ratio of the change of stock held by directors, is with positive relation to discretionary accruals in year t and t+1, and th

12、e ratio of the change of stock held by blockholders, is with positive relation to them in year t+2 when the IPOs went public before March, 2001. However, the ratio of the change of stock held by directors, is with positive relation to discretionary accruals from year t to t+2, and the ratio of the c

13、hange of stock held by blockholders, is with positive relation to them in year t+1 and t+2 when the IPOs went public in March, 2001. Sixth, the IPOs which have demand of capital in year t and year t+1, have more incentive to manipulate earnings than those dont have demand of capital. Therefore, the

14、IPOs which have demand of capital in year t+2 dont have more incentive to manipulate earnings than those dont have demand of capital. Seventh, the independent variable, the amount of capital, is with negative relation to discretionary accruals, but the size of capital is with positive relation to th

15、em in the IPOs which have demand of capital in year t, t+1 and t+2. That is, most IPOs with continous growth in their operating performance belong to growth enterprises. Thus, the managers of the IPOs have less incentive to manage earnings. The larger size of capital, the more range of earnings mana

16、gement. Eighth, the effect of the amount of capital decrease gradually on earnings management in the IPOs from year t to year t+2. Key word: Earnings management, motivations of going public, discretionary accruals. IV誌 謝 誌 謝 本文得以完成,首先要感謝指導教授芬師的悉心指導,從文題目的決定、研究設計的討及文內容的修改,師皆給予許多指導,讓學生在文撰寫的過程中獲得極寶貴的經驗,對學生在文章寫作方面有深的體悟,另外,在撰寫文的過程中

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