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1、Testimony Assessing North Koreas Chemical and Biological Weapons Capabilities and Prioritizing Countermeasures John V. Parachini CT-486 Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, and the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
2、on January 17, 2018. 1Assessing North Koreas Chemical and Biological Weapons Capabilities and Prioritizing Countermeasures Testimony of John V. Parachini1 The RAND Corporation2 Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade and the Subcommittee on Asia
3、and the Pacific United States House of Representatives January 17, 2018 ny conflict on the Korean peninsula could entail the use of chemical or biological weapons (CBW), including a conflict short of a nuclear exchange. For this reason, it is important not to let attention to nuclear weapons cause u
4、s to overlook these other potentially lethal threats, to assess the extent to which North Korea may have these capabilities, and evaluate the threat they may pose. In addition, the use of CBW could easily escalate a conflict to the nuclear level. However, it is important to not exaggerate the threat
5、 that CBW present. In one of the heavily armed regions of the world, underestimation or overestimation of a threat can skew precious resources and leadership time one way or another, and prioritizing the threats of different weapons categories is essential. Clearly, nuclear weapons are our greatest
6、concern, but calibrating how CBW and conventional weapons factor into the current military standoff or raise the threat of war is more important today than it has been since the end of the Korean War. Information about North Koreas CBW capability is incomplete. What information is available has chan
7、ged over the years and has come from various sources, some of which are indirect and difficult to validate and are shrouded by the North Koreans skill at denial and deception. There are some parallels with what we knew about Iraqs weapons of mass 1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this test
8、imony are the authors alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research. 2 The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer an
9、d more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. A 2destruction (WMD) programs before 2003. In the Iraqi case, we knew a good deal about the past programs, but not much about the state of the program at the start of the 2003 military
10、 operations. In contrast, in the North Korean case, we dont know much about the past, and sourcing on the present is far from certain. In this statement, I draw on unclassified sources to outline what we believe we know about North Koreas CBW capabilities, how they might be employed in a conflict, t
11、he prospect that North Korea may share these capabilities with others, and possible countermeasures that the United States and the international community should consider to reduce these capabilities and the motivations to use or transfer them. Calibrating the threat of North Korean CBW capabilities
12、 is important for allocating precious U.S. and allied resources. It is important to hedge against even low-probability threats if they have high consequences. Any military capability may escalate to the nuclear precipice. U.S. and international community efforts should therefore aim to reduce the po
13、ssibility for North Korea to use CBW capabilities because of their potential to escalate military operations to a nuclear level as well as the mass death CBW may cause if used against heavily populated areas. Information Sources on North Korean CBW Capabilities We know far less about North Koreas ch
14、emical and biological programs than its missile and nuclear programs in part because we have fewer and less-reliable sources of information. Unlike nuclear tests, which generate seismic signatures, and missile launches, which can be detected via a variety of technical collection methods, CBW acquisi
15、tion, production, and testing can be hidden in legitimate industrial infrastructure. For the most part, North Koreas nuclear and ballistic missile activities are overt and generally conducted from known facilities. For chemical and biological weapons, acquisition is difficult to discern because the
16、equipment and material can also be used for industrial and commercial activities. Production of CBW agents can appear to be legitimate industrial operations; legitimate industrial operations can also be converted to the production of warfare capabilities comparatively easily. North Korean Chemical Weapons Capabilities: A High Priority Threat North Korea is believed to have a varied and robust chemical weapons arsenal. The consensus vi
