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1、模拟试题 二一、名词解释：（共 16 分）1边际技术替代率递减规律2纳什均衡3IS 曲线4平衡预算乘数二、单项选择题（共 10 分）1垄断市场中的厂商和行业的短期供给曲线（）A. 没有规律性 B.向右上方倾斜 C.向左上方倾斜 D.为一水平线2下列说法中正确的是（）A. 纳什均衡一定是占优策略均衡，而占优策略均衡不一定就是纳什均衡B. 占优策略均衡一定是纳什均衡，而纳什均衡不一定就是占优策略均衡C. 占优策略均衡不一定是纳什均衡，纳什均衡也不一定是占优策略均衡D. 占优策略均衡一定是纳什均衡，纳什均衡也一定就是占优策略均衡3可以使两个罪犯永久合作下去的方式是（）A.合作一次 B.合作有限次 C
2、.合作无限次 D.没有方法4如果所有的个人和企业都是以自我利益为中心的价格接受者，则竞争均衡（）A.不会有帕累托最优效率 B.不可能具有帕累托最优效率 C.可能具有帕累托最优效率 D.肯定具有帕累托最优效率5下列关于生命周期假说和永久收入假说的说法中正确的是（）A. 生命周期假说偏重于对储蓄动机的分析，而永久收入假说则偏重于个人如何预测自己未来收入的问题B. 永久收入假说偏重于对储蓄动机的分析，而生命周期假说则偏重于个人如何预测自己未来收入的问题C. 生命周期假说和永久收入假说都是对对储蓄动机的分析D. 生命周期假说和永久收入假说都关心个人如何预测自己未来收入的问题6投资的边际效率随着投资支出
3、的增加而（）A. 逐渐增加 B. 逐渐递减 C.保持不变 D.不确定7下列选项中不属于货币政策工具的是（）A.公开市场业务 B.贴现率 C.政府转移支付 D.法定准备率以及道义上的劝告8总需求曲线向右下方倾斜不取决于（）A. 实际余额效应 B.时际替代效应 C.开放替代效应 D.货币余额效用9关于充分就业的说法中正确的是（）A. 充分就业并不代表所有人都就业 B. 充分就业代表所有劳动力都就业C. 充分就业代表所有人都就业 D. 充分就业率就是自然率10下列关于通货膨胀的说法正确的是（）A.通货膨胀使债权人受益 B. 通货膨胀使债务人受益C. 通货膨胀使债权人债务人都受益 D. 通货膨胀对债务
4、无影响三判断题（共 10 分）1我总愿意用 6 单位的 x 替代 1 单位的 y，我的偏好违背了单调性假设。 （）2微观经济学的基本假设：（1）合乎理性人的假设条件；（2）完全信息的假设条件。（）3GDP= 工资+利息+ 租金+利润+ 间接税和转移支付+折旧。 （）4规模报酬变动的主要原因是内在经济和内在不经济、外在经济和外在不经济。 （）5货币幻觉可能会引起实际消费支出的下降，但不可能引起实际消费支出的上升。 （）6对完全竞争厂商来说，其短期均衡的条件为 P=MC。 （）7可排他的公共物品常有供给不足的现象，无法排他的公共物品常有利用不足的现象。（）8CPI 会夸大通货膨胀的程度。 （）9固
5、定汇率和资本完全流动的条件下，单独一个国家的货币政策有效。 （）10成本推动型通货膨胀是一种货币现象。 （）四计算题（共 20 分，每题 10 分）1某垄断竞争市场中一厂商的长期总成本函数为：LTC=0.001Q*Q*Q-0.425Q*Q+85Q。设该市场中不存在进入障碍，产量由该市场的整个产品集团调整。如果产品集团中所有厂商按同样比例调整他们的价格，出售产品的实际需求曲线为 Q=300-2.5P。（1）计算厂商长期均衡产量和价格；（2）计算厂商主观需求曲线上长期均衡点的弹性。2假设有一经济社会是由三部门构成的。其消费函数为 C=20+0.8（Y-T） ，投资函数为I=600-4000r，政府
6、支出 G=420，税收函数 T=100+0.25Y，名义货币供给 Ms=345，货币需求函数为 Md=25+0.4Y-4000r。试求：（1）IS 曲线方程式；（2）当价格水平 P=1 时，LM 曲线的方程式；（3）当价格水平 P=1 时，产品市场和货币市场同时均衡时的利率和收入；（4）总需求曲线方程式。五简答题（共 16 分，每题 8 分）1完全竞争市场的有效性体现在哪几个方面？2货币政策的含义及其局限性。六论述题（共 28 分，每题 14 分）1帕累托最优。2评述新古典增长理论。七英语翻译（50 分）Great barrier griefONE consequence of the wor
7、st economic crisis in 80 years is that dismal scientists everywhere have had to gen up on the Depression in order to contribute to the policy debate. Most have by now picked up the stylised fact that a rigid adherence to the gold standard made a bad slump worse. Countries that cut the link to gold q
8、uickly and allowed their currencies to fluctuate endured shallower recessions and recovered more quickly than those that stuck with it. Freed from the need to uphold a gold-price parity, these countries could lower interest rates and so stimulate spending. By devaluing against gold, their money also
9、 became cheaper against currencies that kept their gold parity, giving domestic producers a cost advantage over many foreign firms.A new paper* by Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley, and Douglas Irwin of Dartmouth College adds a fresh dimension to this analysis. It examines
10、how the decision to quit gold or to cleave to it affected trade policies. The picture painted by most accounts is of a rush to erect new barriers to trade, as each country tried to shield its businesses and workers from the deepening slump and responded in kind to the protectionism of others. In fac
11、t, say the authors, trade barriers were not imposed uniformly. Countries that stuck with gold were more protectionist than those that abandoned it. Tariffs were a poor substitute for policy stimulus, but in an era of balanced budgets they were all that gold-standard countries had.In order to stand u
12、p that claim, the authors first show how the global monetary system broke down. In the decades leading up to the first world war, paper currencies were backed by gold at a fixed parity, in effect linking countries through a system of pegged exchange rates. Once war broke out, the system went into ab
13、eyance. When the gold standard was revived in the 1920s, it was a more fragile entity. Despite high inflation in the meantime, many countries restored their pre-war gold parities. With more money in circulation that led to a shortage of bullion. So the two main paper currencies, sterling and the dol
14、lar, were used as gold substitutes. Such a ruse relied on credible monetary policy in both Britain and America.Of the two America is often seen as the main culprit for the spread of protectionism. The infamous Smoot-Hawley act, which was passed in June 1930 and increased nearly 900 American import d
15、uties, is usually viewed as central to the collapse in world trade that followed. But Messrs Eichengreen and Irwin argue that it was Britains ditching of gold in September 1931 that really started the “avalanche” of protectionism.The ensuing rush to protect home markets served only to depress commer
16、ce further. By 1933 the volume of world trade was down by one-quarter from its 1929 level. Many of Britains trading partners responded quickly to sterlings devaluation by coming off gold too. Two groups of countries held out for longer. The first, including Germany and Austria, was haunted by memories of hyperinflation and fearful of the consequences for financial stability of de-link
