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1、Dominant and dangerous As Americas economic supremacy fades, the primacy of the dollar looks unsustainable IF HEGEMONS are good for anything, it is for conferring stability on the systems they dominate. For 70 years the dollar has been the superpower of the financial and monetary system. Despite tal
2、k of the yuans rise, the primacy of the greenback is unchallenged. As a means of payment, a store of value and a reserve asset, nothing can touch it. Yet the dollars rule has brittle foundations, and the system it underpins is unstable. Worse, the alternative reserve currencies are flawed. A transit
3、ion to a more secure order will be devilishly hard. When the buck stops For decades, Americas economic might legitimised the dollars claims to reign supreme. But, as our special report this week explains, a faultline has opened between Americas economic clout and its financial muscle. The United Sta
4、tes accounts for 23% of global GDP and 12% of merchandise trade. Yet about 60% of the worlds output, and a similar share of the planets people, lie within a de facto dollar zone, in which currencies are pegged to the dollar or move in some sympathy with it. American firms share of the stock of inter
5、national corporate investment has fallen from 39% in 1999 to 24% today. But Wall Street sets the rhythm of markets globally more than it ever did. American fund managers run 55% of the worlds assets under management, up from 44% a decade ago. The widening gap between Americas economic and financial
6、power creates problems for other countries, in the dollar zone and beyond. That is because the costs of dollar dominance are starting to outweigh the benefits. First, economies must endure wild gyrations. In recent months the prospect of even a tiny rate rise in America has sucked capital from emerg
7、ing markets, battering currencies and share prices. Decisions of the Federal Reserve affect offshore dollar debts and deposits worth about $9 trillion. Because some countries link their currencies to the dollar, their central banks must react to the Fed. Foreigners own 20-50% of local-currency gover
8、nment bonds in places like Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey: they are more likely to abandon emerging markets when American rates rise. At one time the pain from capital outflows would have been mitigated by the stronger demandincluding for importsthat prompted the Fed to raise r
9、ates in the first place. However, in the past decade Americas share of global merchandise imports has dropped from 16% to 13%. America is the biggest export market for only 32 countries, down from 44 in 1994; the figure for China has risen from two to 43. A system in which the Fed dispenses and the
10、world convulses is unstable. A second problem is the lack of a backstop for the offshore dollar system if it faces a crisis. In 2008-09 the Fed reluctantly came to the rescue, acting as a lender of last resort by offering $1 trillion of dollar liquidity to foreign banks and central banks. The sums i
11、nvolved in a future crisis would be far higher. The offshore dollar world is almost twice as large as it was in 2007. By the 2020s it could be as big as Americas banking industry. Since 2008-09, Congress has grown wary of the Feds emergency lending. Come the next crisis, the Feds plans to issue vast
12、 swaplines might meet regulatory or congressional resistance. For how long will countries be ready to tie their financial systems to Americas fractious and dysfunctional politics? That question is underscored by a third worry: America increasingly uses its financial clout as a political tool. Policy
13、makers and prosecutors use the dollar payment system to assert control not just over wayward bankers and dodgy football officials, but also errant regimes like Russia and Iran. Rival powers bridle at this vulnerability to American foreign policy. Americans may wonder why this matters to them. They d
14、id not force any country to link its currency to the dollar or encourage foreign firms to issue dollar debt. But the dollars outsize role does affect Americans. It brings benefits, not least cheaper borrowing. Alongside the “exorbitant privilege” of owning the reserve currency, however, there are co
15、sts. If the Fed fails to act as lender of last resort in a dollar liquidity crisis, the ensuing collapse abroad will rebound on Americas economy. And even without a crisis, the dollars dominance will present American policymakers with a dilemma. If foreigners continue to accumulate reserves, they wi
16、ll dominate the Treasury market by the 2030s. To satisfy growing foreign demand for safe dollar-denominated assets, Americas government could issue more Treasuriesadding to its debts. Or it could leave foreigners to buy up other securitiesbut that might lead to asset bubbles, just as in the mortgage boom of the 2000s. Its all about the Benjamins Ideally America would share the burden with other currencies. Yet if the hegemony of the dollar is unstable, its would-be successors are unsuitable.
