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1、,第 17 章,信息不对称的市场,本章要讨论的问题,质量不确定性与柠檬市场 市场信号 道德风险 委托代理问题,2,Chapter 1,本章要讨论的问题,一体化企业的管理激励问题 劳动力市场的信息不对称: 效率工资理论,3,Chapter 1,引言,我们将研究不完全信息对资源配置和价格机制所产生的影响。,4,Chapter 1,质量不确定与柠檬市场,在购买一辆二手车时，由于信息不完全，将增加购买的风险并降低消费者的效用；,5,Chapter 1,二手车市场 假定 买卖双方都能鉴别高质量和低质量的车； 将会出现两个市场；,质量不确定与柠檬市场,6,Chapter 1,柠檬问题,PH,PL,QH,Q
2、L,The Market for Used Cars With asymmetric information: Low quality goods drive high quality goods out of the market. The market has failed to produce mutually beneficial trade. Too many low and too few high quality cars are on the market. Adverse selection occurs; the only cars on the market will b
3、e low quality cars.,Quality Uncertaintyand the Market for Lemons,8,Chapter 1,Implications of Asymmetric Information,Medical Insurance Question Is it possible for insurance companies to separate high and low risk policy holders? If not, only high risk people will purchase insurance. Adverse selection
4、 would make medical insurance unprofitable.,The Market for Insurance,9,Chapter 1,Implications of Asymmetric Information,Automobile Insurance Questions What impact does asymmetric information and adverse selection have on insurance rates and the delivery of automobile accident insurance? How can the
5、government reduce the impact of adverse selection in the insurance industry?,The Market for Insurance,10,Chapter 1,Implications of Asymmetric Information,The Market for Credit Asymmetric information creates the potential that only high risk borrowers will seek loans. Question How can credit historie
6、s help make this market more efficient and reduce the cost of credit?,11,Chapter 1,Implications of Asymmetric Information,The Importance of Reputation and Standardization Asymmetric Information and Daily Market Decisions Retail sales Antiques, art, rare coins Home repairs Restaurants,12,Chapter 1,Im
7、plications of Asymmetric Information,Question How can these producers provide high-quality goods when asymmetric information will drive out high-quality goods through adverse selection. Answer Reputation,13,Chapter 1,Implications of Asymmetric Information,Question Why do you look forward to a Big Ma
8、c when traveling even though you would never consider buying one at home. Holiday Inn once advertised “No Surprises” to address the issue of adverse selection.,14,Chapter 1,Lemons in Major League Baseball,Asymmetric information and the market for free agents If a lemons market exists, free agents sh
9、ould be less reliable (disabled) than renewed contracts.,15,Chapter 1,Player Disability,All Players4.7312.55165.4 Renewed players4.769.68103.4 Free agents4.6717.23268.9,16,Chapter 1,Findings Days on the disabled list increase for both free agents and renewed players. Free agents have a significantly
10、 higher disability rate than renewed players. This indicates a lemons market.,Lemons in Major League Baseball,17,Chapter 1,Question If you are a team owner, what steps would you take to reduce the asymmetric information for free agents?,Lemons in Major League Baseball,18,Chapter 1,Market Signaling,T
11、he process of sellers using signals to convey information to buyers about the products quality helps buyers and sellers deal with asymmetric information.,19,Chapter 1,Market Signaling,Strong Signal To be effective, a signal must be easier for high quality sellers to give than low quality sellers. Ex
12、ample Highly productive workers signal with educational attainment level.,20,Chapter 1,Market Signaling,A Simple Model of Job Market Signaling Assume Two groups of workers Group I: Low productivity-AP a = 0; R = $15,000 R = $10,000 or $20,000, w = 0 R = $40,000; w = $24,000 R = $30,000; Profit = $18
13、,000 Net wage = $2,000,54,Chapter 1,The Principal-Agent Problem,Incentives in the Principal-Agent Framework Choosing a Wage w = R - $18,000 Net wage = $2,000 High effort,55,Chapter 1,The Principal-Agent Problem,Conclusion Incentive structure that rewards the outcome of high levels of effort can indu
14、ce agents to aim for the goals set by the principals.,56,Chapter 1,The Principal-Agent Problem,Asymmetric Information and Incentive Design in the Integrated Firm In integrated firms, division managers have better (asymmetric) information about production than central management,57,Chapter 1,The Prin
15、cipal-Agent Problem,Asymmetric Information and Incentive Design in the Integrated Firm Two Issues How can central management illicit accurate information How can central management achieve efficient divisional production,58,Chapter 1,The Principal-Agent Problem,Possible Incentive Plans Bonus based o
16、n output or profit Will this plan provide an incentive for accurate information?,59,Chapter 1,The Principal-Agent Problem,Possible Incentive Plans Bonus based on how close the managers get to their forecasts of output and profits Qf = estimate of feasible production level B = bonus in dollars Q = actual output B = 10,000 - .5(Qf - Q) Incentive to underestimate Qf,60,Chapter 1,The Principal-Agent Problem,Possible Incentive P
