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1、优秀毕业论文天津大学博士学位论文风险投资中的博弈论模型姓名：徐松申请学位级别：博士专业：管理科学与工程指导教师：唐万生20070101精品参考文献资料中文摘要自上世纪初博弈论形成以来，它在经济学方面的应用就越来越广泛，并 有大量成熟的理论和模型出现在近20年，随着新经济和信息技术的迅速发 展，风险投资开始盛行起来最初，只是一些个人投资者进入这一高风险、 高收益的投资领域，参与个人创业者的项目；现在。则更多是专业的投资机 构雇佣专业的投资分析师进行风险投资项目的分析和投资运作对于风险投 资的研究，目前的成果主要侧重于从风险投资者的角度对投资项目和创业者 进行评价，而忽略了双方之间存在的博弈行为I
2、本文从风险投资者和创业者双方的博弈行为和策略出发，将博弈论用于 风险投资运作的研究和分析，主要工作如下：在非连续努力水平的情况下，建立风险投资者和创业者之间的基础博弈 模型，在此基础上，对第三阶段的博弈进行着重分析，并依照风险投资者和 创业者决策变量的不同，以及双方是否进行合作博弈，分别建立了四个不同 的博弈模型。建立了风险投资者和创业者分别以投资额度和努力水平为决策变量的 非合作博弈模型，证明了该博弈模型Nash均衡解的存在性，分析了创业者 的努力水平和风险投资者投资额度之间的互动性，并由此给出了求该博弈模 型Nash均衡解的迭代算法建立了风险投资者和创业者分别以股权分配比例和努力水平为决策
3、变 量的非合作博弈模型，同样证明了其Nash均衡的存在性，并分析了股权分 配比例对努力水平的影响，给出了一个求得满意解的方法建立了风险投资者和创业者分别以投资额度和努力水平为决策变量的合 作博弈模型，给出了合作联盟最优解的必要条件，分析了合作模型的联盟最 优解和非合作博弈模型的Nash均衡解之间的关系、联盟最优解的稳定性， 以及保持联盟最优解稳定所需的附加条件，并给出了达到联盟最优解的迭代 算法建立了风险投资者和创业者分别以股权分配比例和努力水平为决策变第零章量的合作博弈模型，给出了联盟最优解的必要条件，分析了合作模型的联盟 最优解和非合作模型的满意解之间的关系、联盟最优解的稳定性，以及联盟
4、达到最大效用的分配原则关键词；风险投资，风险投资者，创业者，博弈论，Nash均衡，效用函数， 股权分配比例，联盟llABSTRACTGame Theory has had a more and more extensive巨pplication in eco-nomic fields since its foundation in last centuryLAnd a large number ofintegrated theories and models have been arisenIn the latest decade,venture capl-R-dI I丽b-石enprevai
5、ling as蕊面团development of new economiesand information technologiesAt first，0nly some individual investors entered into this high时i8k and profitable investment taking part in the project of in dividual entrepreneursAnd now，the venture capital project岛have been an alyzed and operated by occupational i
6、nvestment analysts in the professional investing organizationsHowever，the present studies focus on the evaluationof investingprojects and entrepreneurs from the venture capitalistsaspectignoring the game behaviors between themIn this dissertationj game theory is used to study and analyze the oper at
7、-i-0-fi of venture capital from the aspect of game behaviors and s。t。r。a。t。e。g。i。e。sof venture capitalists and entrepreneursThe main works are as follows：Under忱e condition of in-continuous hardworking levelit establishesthat the basic game model between the venture capitalists and entrepreneursBased
8、 on this堕必the third stage of games stress is analyzedAnd fourgame theory models are established according to different ttecision variables of venture capital and the concrete game structure，noncooperative or co- operative。A non-cooperative game model is presented with the amount of invest ment and h
9、ardworking level as venture capitalistsand entrepreneursstrate gies variablesThe Nash equilibrium of this model is proven existentAnd it id argued that there is interaction between the level bf entrepreneurshardworking and the amount of venture capitalsMoreover，the iterative algo-【is出洒卫ed accordingl
10、y for solving the Nash equilibrium Qf也i8 mmielA noncooperative game model is presented with the ratio of sharesdistribution and hardworking level as venture capitalistsand entrepreneurs strategies variablesThe existence of Nash equilibrium is proven in the same wayIt is also proven that the ratio of
11、 shares distribution affects hardworking levelAnd the means to find the satisfactory solution are givenA cooperative game model is established with the amount of investmentand hardworking level as ven-e-fiVfi两capitalistsand entrepreneursstrategiesvariablesrrhe necessaryconditions矸oalition optimal so
12、lution are pre-sented Dd it is analyzed theintoraction b堂t二晒瑾壁n the coalitian optimalsolution of cooperative game model and the Nash equilibrium solution of noncooperative game model and the stability of coalition optimal and the adjunctive conditions for keeping coalition optimal stableThe iterativ
13、e al- gorithm is derived to reach the coalition optimal solutionA cooperative game model is established with the ratio of shared dis tribution and hard-working level as venture capitalistsand entrepreneurs strategies variablesThe necessary conditions of coalition optimal solution are presentedAnd it
14、 is analyzed the interaction between the coalition op timal solution of cooperative game model and the satisfactory solution of non-cooperative game model，the stability of coalition optimal and the ad junctive conditionsor keeping coalition optimalbtable and the distribution principle of maximal coa
15、lition utilityKeywords：Venturd Capital，Venture Capitalist，Entrepreneur，Game The ory,Nash Equilibrium，Utility Function，Ratio of Shares Distribution，Coali tionlV独创性声明本人声明所呈交的学位论文是本人在导师指导下进行的研究工作和取 得的研究成果，除了文中特别加以标注和致谢之处外，论文中不包含其他人 已经发表或撰写过的研究成果，也不包含为获得天津大学或其他教育机 构的学位或汪书而使用过的材料与我一I一工作的I司志对本研究所做的任何 贡献均已在论文中作了
