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1、此文档是毕业设计外文翻译成品（ 含英文原文+中文翻译），无需调整复杂的格式！下载之后直接可用，方便快捷！本文价格不贵,也就几十块钱！一辈子也就一次的事！外文标题：Changes in the Measurement of Fair Value: Implications for Accounting Earnings外文作者：Fargher, Neil， Zhang, John Ziyang文献出处: Accounting Forum, Volume 38, Issue 3, September 2019, Pages 184-199 (如觉得年份太老，可改为近2年，毕竟很多毕业生都这样做)英
2、文4282单词，27692字符(字符就是印刷符)，中文6984汉字。（如果字数多了，可自行删减，大多数学校都是要求选取外文的一部分内容进行翻译的。）Changes in the Measurement of Fair Value: Implications for Accounting EarningsAbstract： With the FASBs issue of staff position papers in 2009 and the relaxation of how fair value standards are applied, there has been a change
3、in the practice of how fair value is measured. Since the FASB staff position papers in 2009, fair value measurement by financial institutions has increasingly relied on managerial assumptions. This study examines the impact of this change on the quality of earnings. Consistent with attribute substit
4、ution theory that emphasises reliability over relevance, we find that an apparent increase in managerial discretion in fair value measurement is associated with a higher probability of earnings management and lower earnings informativeness. The results indicate that allowing more managerial discreti
5、on in fair value measurement adversely affected the quality of financial reporting. Our study highlights the issue of reliable measurement in the debate among academics and practitioners of increasing the use of fair value accounting.1.IntroductionDrawing upon evidence from the case of Enron, Gwilli
6、am and Jackson (2008) argue that the unreliability of mark to market valuations originates from managers desire to manipulate earnings. More recently there has been a change in the practice of how fair value is measured after the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB)s relaxation of the applicat
7、ion of standards on fair value measurement (FASB 2009a, FASB 2009b). Fair value measurement increasingly relies on managerial assumptions, even including cases where a market price exists. Such a change has been subject to much debate among regulators, bank executives and investors (Bushman and Land
8、sman 2010). Supporters of the change argue that giving managers more discretion in fair value measurement will convey more relevant information. To the contrary, critics argue that greater flexibility in fair value measurement will be opportunistically exploited by managers and will adversely affect
9、 the reliability of fair value measurement. While prior research documents the existence of potential manipulationof fair value estimates (Huizinga and Laeven 2009; Dechow et al. 2010b; Fiecher and Meyer 2010; Vyas 2010), there is relatively little empirical evidence specifically examining whether a
10、dditional managerial discretion allowed by accounting standards on fair value measurement will, on average, reveal more about a firms economic fundamentals or degrade the quality of earnings.This study extends the emerging literature on managerial discretion in fair value estimates to explore the qu
11、estion: “What are the effects of additional discretion in fair value measurement allowed by changes in accounting standards on banks earnings?” Specifically, this study uses the relaxation by the FASB of the application of fair value standards for banks (FASB 2009a, 2009b) to examine the relation be
12、tween the change of fair value measurement in practice and the quality of banks earnings. In a move changing the standards on fair value measurement to enhance the relevance of financial reporting, the FASB issued three FASB Staff Position papers (FSPs) in April 2009 that effectively granted manager
13、s more flexibility to measure fair value assets at level 2 and 3 even where markets for the securities existed.2 Bushman and Landsman (2010, page 271) state that: “both the FASB and IASB bent to political pressure and generally allowed banks more flexibility in applying their fair value accounting.”
14、 This event provides an opportunity to examine the effects of increased managerial discretion in fair value measurement on banks earnings quality.In examining the quality of earnings, we focus on two attributes: reliability and relevance. These are two qualities of financial information used by both
15、 the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) in standard setting. To examine the reliability and relevance of earnings, consistent with the literature (eg., Dechow et al. 2010a), we examine the probability of earnings management and the infor
16、mativeness of earnings as reflected in investors response to earnings announcements. Using a sample of U.S. bank holding companies with fair value hierarchy disclosures, we find that an increase in measurement discretion in fair value increases the probability of meeting or beating analysts forecasts and the effect occurs during the period after the relaxation of fair value rules. We also find that an increase in discretionary fair value assets negatively
